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 Abstract 
This paper compares the productive efficiencies of four models of primary care service delivery in Ontario, Canada, using 
the data envelopment analysis (DEA) method.  Particular care is taken to include quality of service as part of our output 
measure.  The influence of the delivery model on productive efficiency is disentangled from patient characteristics using 
regression analysis.  Significant differences are found in the efficiency scores across models and within each model.  In 
general, the fee-for-service arrangement ranks the highest and the community-health-centre model the lowest in efficiency 
scoring.  The reliance of our input measures on costs and number of patients, clearly favours the fee-for-service model.  
Patient characteristics contribute little to explaining differences in the efficiency ranking across the models. 
 
Keywords: Productive Efficiency; DEA; Primary Health Care 
JEL classification: I12, I19 
 
Résumé 
Cet article compare l’efficience productive dans quatre modèles de prestation de soins primaires en Ontario, au Canada, 
en utilisant la méthodologie du DEA (Data Envelopement Analysis). Une attention particulière a été portée sur l’inclusion 
la qualité du service de soin santé dans la mesure de l’extrant (output). L'influence du modèle de prestation sur l'efficience 
productive a été séparée des caractéristiques du patient en utilisant une analyse de régression. Des différences 
significatives ont été trouvées dans l'efficience   entre modèles et à l’intérieur de chaque modèle. En général, les 
arrangements avec services-payants arrivent en tête, alors que les modèles de centre de santé communautaire performent 
le moins en termes d’efficience. Le recours au coût et au nombre de patients comme mesure de l’intrant est nettement 
favorable au modèle avec services-payants. Les caractéristiques du patient contribuent peu à expliquer les différences 
dans le classement de l'efficience entre les modèles. 
 
Mots clé: Efficience Productive; DEA; Soin Primaires 
Classification JEL: I12, I19 
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Introduction 
 
This paper undertakes an efficiency comparison of four distinct models of primary health care 
service delivery in Ontario using the methodology of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA): fee-
for-service practices including Family Health Groups (FFS/FHGs), health service organizations 
(HSOs), family health networks (FHN)s, and community health centres (CHCs).  The analysis 
draws on data collected between 2005 and 2006 as part of a multidisciplinary project funded by 
the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care entitled “Comparison of Models of Primary 
Health Care in Ontario”.  A comprehensive study of the performance of these models has been 
lacking (Muldoon, Rowan, Geneau, Hogg & Coulson, 2006).
 
Previous studies of efficiency in the provision of primary care have employed the number of 
visits and tests as an intermediate output measure (Huang & McLaughlin, 1989; Andes, Metzger, 
Kralewski & Gans, 2002; Linna, Nordblad & Koivu, 2003; Kirigia, Emrouznejad, Sambo, 
Munguti & Liambila, 2004; Rosenman & Friesner, 2004).  Relatively few studies (Salinas-
Jimenez & Smith, 1996; and Wagner, Shimshak & Novak, 2003) have incorporated measures of 
quality of care into the measurement of efficiency.  In contrast, this study integrates several 
performance indicators measuring health service delivery and quality of care, and evaluates their 
cumulative influence on efficiency of primary care practices. 
In Ontario, the longest standing model with the largest number of participating physicians is the 
fee-for-service model in which physicians are paid on a per-service basis with relatively flat fee 
schedule across services. Since physician income increases with the quantity of services 
provided under this payment model, and because physicians are better able to evaluate the 
patient’s health care needs than are patients themselves, some claim that FFS physicians will be 
volume-driven (Evans, 1974; Pauly, 1980; Arrow, 1986; McGuire, 2000).  The Cochrane 
Review (Gosden, Forland, Kristiansen, Sutton, Leese, Giuffrida et al. 2000) of the empirical    2 
literature concludes that fee-for-service, as compared to capitation, results in more primary care 
visit contacts, and more diagnostic and curative services, but fewer hospital referrals and fewer 
repeat prescriptions.  Family Health Groups (FHGs) are a new model of service delivery in 
Ontario that is similar to pure fee-for-service.  In this study traditional fee-for-service physicians 
and FHG physicians are lumped together and referred to as FFS.  Currently there are about 7,439 
pure FFS physicians in Ontario servicing some 9.2 million patients and about 2536 FHG 
physicians servicing 3.7 million patients (Coulson, 2005; Muldoon, Rowan, Geneau, Hogg & 
Coulson, 2006). 
It has long been argued (Ellis & McGuire, 1986; Ma, 1994; Newhouse, 1996) that when 
patients are rostered, and physicians paid a flat fee per patient in their practice, doctors have 
powerful incentives to provide services in a cost-effective manner.  Equally importantly, 
capitation-based payment schemes provide cost predictability for public health authorities.  This 
view underlay the introduction of health service organizations in Ontario in 1975 (Gillett, 
Hutchison and Birch, 2001).  HSO physicians register their patients and are paid a monthly 
capitation fee, differing with age and gender.  The fee is partially clawed back if a rostered 
patient is provided with primary care service outside the HSO.   There are 49 HSOs in Ontario 
with 160 physicians serving 255,000 patients. A single HSO can have multiple geographically 
distinct sites of operation.    
A weakness with capitation-based physician remuneration is that this encourages 
physicians to engage in cream-skimming, that is, to roster only those patients whom they expect 
to be relatively healthy, or to offload costs to the non-capitated sector, e.g., by referring patients 
to specialists (Newhouse, 1984; Pauly, 1984; Dranove, 1987; Allen & Gertler, 1991; Ellis, 1998; 
Mulligan, 2002).   Mixed payment mechanisms – combining some element of fee-for-service 
and some element of capitation-based payment – have therefore been proposed as a means of    3 
providing physicians with balanced incentives to provide quality care to patients with a variety 
of risk profiles, while still providing reasonable control of the overall cost of delivery of primary 
health care (Ellis & McGuire, 1986, 1993; Ma, 1994, Ellis 1998; Chalkey and Malcomson, 1998; 
Jelovac, 2001; Jack, 2005).  In Ontario, Family Health Networks (FHNs) were introduced in 
2001 to provide comprehensive care for their patients 24 hours a day, seven days a week.  
Physicians working in these networks are paid under a blended scheme, combining a capitation 
fee for rostered patients with specific bonuses or fee-for-service payments which encourage 
doctors to provide preventive services and services additional to those specified in the roster 
agreement.  FHN physicians receive a bonus for each new patient rostered and fee-for-service 
payments at a rate of 10% of the provincial schedule for most services. 
  Whereas each of the previous three models positively link physician income to some 
measure of service provision, the fourth model pays physicians a straight salary.  Community 
Health Centres (CHCs) are community-oriented, and with a primary mandate to address 
disadvantaged populations’ needs.  Introduced widely across Ontario in the 1980s, these 
interdisciplinary teams are one-stop health care shops for patients including physicians, nurse 
practitioners, nurses, physiotherapists, chiropodists, social workers and other health and 
community health professionals.  Economic theory (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Laffont & 
Tirole, 1993) suggests that salaried physicians can be expected to see a low volume of patients 
(but will therefore provide higher-quality care).  Empirical studies included in the Cochrane 
Review (Gosden, Forland, Kristiansen, Sutton, Leese, Giuffrida et al. 2000), as well Sorensen & 
Grytten (2003) (focusing on Norway), and Devlin & Sarma (2007) (focusing on Canada) show 
that salary payments lower the volume of services provided.  However, these authors do not find 
that an increased number of visits/procedures is associated with better patient care.  Yalnizyan &    4 
Macdonald (2005) report on several studies supporting the view that CHCs provide higher 
quality care than FFS. 
   
Methodology 
  DEA is a nonparametric linear programming technique (Farrell, 1957; Charnes, Cooper 
& Rhodes, 1978).  It measures relative efficiencies, rather than absolute efficiencies, as it judges 
performance relative to others in the sample, and not against a theoretically constructed absolute 
measure of efficiency.  The DEA approach permits the evaluation of practice sites’ performance 
by a single efficiency score which takes account of the variety of different outputs produced, the 
quality of those outputs, and the inputs used.  The definition of efficiency underlying DEA is 
illustrated in Figure1, for a production technology consisting of two outputs and one input. 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
The area south-west of GCDE in Figure1 indicates all possible combinations of output 1 and 2 
per unit of the input.  Empirically constructed on a particular sample of practice sites, the 
efficiency frontier GCDE represents points with maximal output combinations given one unit of 
input.  Practice sites C and D are located on the efficiency frontier GCDE, hence they receive a 
score of 1.  Practice site A does not lie on the frontier and, thus, is inefficient relative to C and D. 
The inefficiency of site A is measured by the ratio OA/OB, and is less than 1.   
  DEA allows several input and output variables, with different units of measurement, to 
be combined.  Thus, distinct output measures, such as performance indicators (for quality of care 
and health service delivery), service volume and intensity, can be incorporated into the analysis.  
Additionally, the DEA method does not require weights to be assigned a priori to each input and 
output, instead weights are assigned by the DEA program to present every practice site in the    5 
best possible light against the others.  Moreover, DEA does not require the specification of a 
production or a cost function.  Finally, unlike parametric estimation procedures, the technique is 
only moderately vulnerable to the sample size.  The DEA method has been extensively used for 
estimating efficiencies (see Hollingsworth, 2003, for review), and to the best of our knowledge, 
there are no theoretical grounds to prefer any one parametric or non-parametric method of 
efficiency measurement over another in the health care sector (Giuffrida & Gravelle, 2001).  
  However, DEA is not without drawbacks.  Because the efficiency frontier is constructed 
from the sample data, it is vulnerable to data inconsistencies, outliers, or possible errors.  
Moreover, in the absence of time-series data for the same sample, the non-parametric nature of 
the method does not permit a disentangling of real efficiency from random fluctuations.  In 
addition, the choice of inputs and outputs is mostly ad hoc; researchers have to rely largely on 
their understanding of the production processes of the industry in the study.   
  The output from the DEA is an array of efficiency scores which may be used to rank the 
practices within each model and across models; for the most part, the analysis of this paper 
concerns itself with this latter ranking.  Importantly, these scores depend critically upon the 
variables used to measure inputs into production and the outputs.  In the context of this paper, 
efficiency scores may vary because of variation across practices in the mix of patients treated.  
Specifically, practices which specialize in high-need patients may operate differently than 
otherwise.  If so, then simply measuring inputs and outputs without regard to the patients being 
treated will yield “efficiency” scores that are not very meaningful from a policy perspective.  To 
address this problem, we use a two-stage procedure.   First, we calculate efficiency scores using 
the DEA method and use these scores to compare the performance across models.  Second, we 
examine whether a variety of patient characteristics can help to explain inter-model efficiency 
score variation.      6 
 
Data and the choice of input and output variables 
  The data used in this study were collected over the period of 2005-2006.  137 practice 
sites in Ontario were chosen randomly, stratified by model type.  Information on the recruitment 
and representativeness of the practices is presented elsewhere (Hogg et al., 2008).  This paper is 
based on an analysis of 109 practice sites from the four models under study: 19 CHCs, 27 FHN 
sites, 32 FFS sites and 31 HSO sites.  28 practice sites were excluded from the total sample size 
sites due to the lack of expenditure and/or patient data or inconsistencies in the reported 
variables.   
As the DEA approach requires that primary care practice sites be as homogeneous as 
possible, we consider only the clinical primary care component of the services provided.  For the 
purpose of this study, clinical primary care is defined as one-on-one encounters with a physician, 
a nurse practitioner, a registered practical nurse, a nurse or a nursing assistant for the purpose of 
clinical medical care.  While clinical primary care services are virtually the only services 
provided in HSOs, FHNs and FFS, CHCs provide additional services.  The most challenging 
task was to disentangle the cost of the clinical services component from the additional services 
provided by CHCs, such as group activities, outreach community services, counselling and 
education.  Each CHC was requested to provide the personnel data and operations expenditure 
data attributed directly to clinical primary care services.  Capital costs were distributed to the 
clinical primary care component proportionally to the office space occupied by the clinical 
primary care service unit; while overhead costs, including administration expenditures, were 
distributed proportionately to the clinical primary care budget. 
  The primary care practice sites in this study consist mostly of family physicians with few 
specialists present.  Both types of physicians are addressed as physicians in this paper.  The term    7 
‘provider’ refers to both physicians and nurse practitioners (NPs).  To the best of our knowledge 
no consensus is found in the health care literature with regard to the substitutability of doctors 
and nurse practitioners (Laurant M. et al., 2005).  The DEA results presented here are calculated 
under the assumption that one NP equals one-half of a physician; although the rankings of the 
different practice sites change slightly under alternative specifications of this substitutability 
ratio, the collective ranking of the models does not.  
  The number of patients in the practice site relies on numbers that are reported by the 
practice site, i.e., the number of patients seen at least once within the past year.  Practice site 
annual costs are comprised of physician incomes, the salaries of medical and administrative 
personnel, operating costs, and maintenance and capital costs (including rent and depreciation of 
capital assets).   Output measures include the average number of visits per patient in the practice 
site, and performance indicators measuring technical quality of care and health service delivery.  
These indicators are based on the best practices reported in the health care literature (Shi, 
Starfield & Xu, 2001) and on established guidelines; they have been calculated using the data 
extracted from patient’s charts and patient surveys.  The calculation procedure is available upon 
request.  Table 1 provides the definition of the variables used in the analyses. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
  Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of the output and the input variables.  Notice 
that the figures in table 2 are not adjusted for patient characteristics which can potentially 
influence outcomes in primary care service delivery; these are adjusted at the second stage of the 
analysis.  
    8 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
  It is interesting to observe from table 2 that CHCs have the highest means for four out of 
the seven output variables when compared to the other three models.  The Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test confirms that the CHCs are statistically different from the other models with 
respect to health promotion, chronic disease management, comprehensiveness and visits per 
patient.  This suggests that the CHC model performs well in terms of quality of care and 
performance measures, and that CHC providers see their patients as often as do providers in FFS 
sites. 
  The HSO model is statistically different from every other model with respect to both 
continuity and access to primary care services scores and has the highest average for these 
variables.  FHNs and CHCs lead in delivery of preventive services.  The fact that FHNs are 
performing well with respect to this indicator should not be surprising given that FHN providers 
receive financial bonuses, which vary with the achieved level of preventive services.  
  Practice site costs per provider, practice site costs per patient, and provider-patient ratio 
are input variables used in the DEA (table 2).  In general, the mean values for these variables are 
the lowest in the FFS model and the highest for the CHC model. These differences are 
statistically significant.  
 
DEA Scenarios and Results 
  The practice output comprises of seven variables described in table 2. Three different 
input scenarios are estimated; the first scenario uses the cost per provider as the input measure; 
in scenario 2 input is the cost per patient and the final scenario uses the provider-patient ratio as    9 
input. We examine the sensitivity of the model’s ranking to the exclusion or inclusion of 
physician income in the cost data.   
  Table 3 synthesizes the efficiency scores by presenting the number of practice sites found 
at decile intervals from 0 to 1, where 1 is the most efficient practice site.  There is clearly 
significant variation across models and within a model; some differences are discernable for the 
input scenarios.   
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Input Scenario 1: Total Cost/Provider 
In scenario 1, with the total cost per provider as the input measure, the mean of the resulting 
efficiency scores is 0.6 and the standard deviation is 0.17.  The distribution of these efficiency 
scores by quartiles is shown in figure 2.  The first quartile shows the highest efficiency scores 
and the fourth quartile the lowest; each bar indicates the percentage of the total number of 
practice sites for each model in a respective quartile.  Observe that the FFS model has the highest 
representation in the first and the second quartile compared to the other models.  The CHC 
model has over 40% of its practice sites located in the lowest quartile, while another 37% of its 
sites are in the third quartile.  The efficiency scores of both the HSO and FHN sites are more 
evenly distributed across all quartiles in comparison to FFS and CHCs.  However, the FHN 
model appears to perform better in terms of efficiency scoring than the HSO model: FHN sites 
have higher representation in the 1
st and the 2
nd quartile, whereas HSO sites – in the 3
rd and the 
4
th quartile.  The explanation for the models’ ranking is that the correlation between the total cost 
per provider variable and the resulting efficiency score variable is very high - 87%.  This means 
that the input variable is driving the results:  CHCs have, on average, the highest total cost per 
provider and FFS sites have the lowest total cost per provider.      10 
   We also investigate whether including physician incomes in the total cost influences the 
efficiency score ranking.  As only about one half of physicians in each practice site were 
approached to self-report their annual before-taxes, there was some concern regarding the 
accuracy of the physician income data for the FFS, FHN and the HSO models.  Given the 
potential biases, we excluded physicians’ income from the cost data.  This worsens the ranking 
of the CHC practices, suggesting that the low CHC rankings are driven by costs other than 
physician salaries.  
Insert  Figure  2  here         
  Another potentially useful way of presenting the results from the DEA analysis is to 
examine the characteristics of the 10% highest-ranked and 10% lowest-ranked practice sites.  
The FFS model is represented most in the top decile, while no CHCs are found in this group.  
CHC and HSO sites are represented most in the bottom decile.  Comparing the top and bottom 
deciles, high efficiency practice sites have more visits per patient per year, undertake more 
preventive measures, are better in chronic disease management, promote health more actively, 
and provide more comprehensive care.  Efficient practice sites have fewer nurses and fewer 
nurse practitioners than the least efficient group, and are more likely to be in an urban area than 
in a rural one.  Top performers also employ fewer administrative personnel.  Interestingly, 
however, is that there are almost no differences with respect to continuity of care, access, and the 
number of physicians in the practice.   
 
Input Scenario 2: Total Cost per Patient 
  The total cost per patient is used as the input measure in Scenario 2. The resulting DEA 
efficiency scores have a mean of 0.44 and standard deviation of 0.23. The top performer in this 
scenario is the FFS model with 40% of its sites in the first quartile and over 70% in the first two    11 
quartiles, followed by the HSO model with 58% of all sites in the first two quartiles.  The 
ranking of CHC practice sites is worsened: almost 80% of sites located in the lowest efficiency 
score quartile are CHCs.  This is explained by the fact that the total cost per patient in CHCs is 
significantly higher, on average, than in other models.  Furthermore, the correlation between 
total costs and total patient roster sizes is the lowest for the CHC model (21.8% compared to 
73.8% for the FFS model), thus it is not the number of patients that is driving up the costs of 
CHCs.  
  
Input Scenario 3: Provider/Patient  
Using the provider-per-patient ratio as the input measure, the average efficiency score for 
the models is 0.41 with a standard deviation of 0.21.  The best performers are HSO and FFS 
models, which are well represented in the first and the second quartile.  The worst performer is 
again the CHC model, which is highly represented in the last quartile and is least represented in 
the first two quartiles.   
 
Comparing Input Scenarios 
  The FFS model is the most efficient performer, dominating the 1
st and the 2
nd quartiles in 
scenarios 1 and 2 and sharing this top position with the HSO model in Scenario 3.  The HSO 
model is the next best performer in Scenarios 2 and 3, but not in scenario 1 where the FHN 
model shines.  The worst performer is the CHC model in all three scenarios.   
  The efficiency ranking across models is determined largely by the input variable ranking.  
The low correlation between the roster size variable and the total expenditure variable may be 
associated with problems in the self-reported patient roster sizes.  There is high variation in 
patient roster sizes for both top and bottom performers.    12 
 
Stage Two: Controlling for Organizational and Patient Characteristics 
Variation in the efficiency scores can be caused by characteristics of the practice sites 
themselves as well as the characteristics of the patients served by these practice sites.  To this 
end, we use the efficiency scores as the dependent variables in a regression analysis which takes 
account of a variety of patient and other characteristics.  The choice of regression technique 
varies according to the problem at hand. Linna, Nordblad, & Koivu (2003) for instance, 
employed a Tobit procedure to examine the influences of a number of factors on efficiency 
scores in oral health care provision.  Tobit is an ideal procedure whenever the data are censored 
at one or both ends of the distribution. In the problem considered in this paper, very few 
observations were found at the high end – only five observations out of 109 in scenario 1 – and 
no observations were found at the low end of the range. As a result, we employ a simple ordinary 
least squares (OLS) technique in the analysis that follows (using a Tobit procedure, however, 
makes very little difference to the results). 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
  The explanatory variables used in the analysis are defined in table 4; descriptive statistics 
are presented in table 5.  The regression results are presented in table 6 for each of the three input 
scenarios.  The OLS model for scenario 1 has the highest explanatory power (R
2 adj. = 0.274) 
and it is also the scenario in which we have the most confidence as it uses data on the number of 
providers per practice rather than on the number of patients. The impact of several patient profile 
variables on efficiency changes dramatically from scenario 1 to scenarios 2 and 3 – likely 
because of the poor quality of the data on the number of patients in each practice upon which the 
last two scenarios are based.  The discussion below focuses mainly on the first scenario.    13 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
  Table 6 reveals that CHCs are less efficient than FFS practices in scenarios 1 and 2. 
However, whenever provider per patient is used as the input, the difference between CHCs and 
FFSs is negative but statistically weak (20% level of significance). As before, whenever total 
costs are used as part of the input measure, CHCs fare very badly.  HSOs are less efficient than 
FFS when costs are used, especially in the first scenario, whereas FHNs are less efficient than 
FFS in the first scenario, but not otherwise.  
  We calculate the percentage difference in efficiency scores across the different models, 
holding constant all other influences. In scenario 1 the estimated coefficient on the CHC dummy 
variable is -0.194.   This means that, in comparison with the FFS model, once the influences 
described in Table 7 are taken into account, the average CHC efficiency score is 28% lower (i.e., 
0.194 divided by the average FFS efficiency score of 0.691). The average HSO score is 17% 
lower than the average FFS practice, while the score of the FHN is 9% lower. 
  Certain patient characteristics help to explain the efficiency scores.  In scenario 1 we find 
that, ceteris paribus, the proportion of patients over age 65 contributes negatively to the 
efficiency score of the practice site, an influence which is reversed in scenarios 2 and 3.  The 
estimated coefficient on MALE is positive (at the 12% level of significance) in Scenario 1, and 
negative and statistically significant for the other two scenarios.  Notice that HSOs improve their 
efficiency ranking in scenarios 2 and 3 compared to scenario 1, and they are also characterized 
by the largest share of patients over 65 years old and of male patients compared to the other 
models.  In contrast, the CHC model has the lowest share in these patient characteristics.  
  For the most part, having more immigrants among a patient population does not seem to 
affect efficient scores, corroborating the findings of Sarma, Devlin & Hogg (2007), and 
consistent with the “healthy-immigrant” effect of McDonald & Kennedy (2004) and Deri (2005).     14 
Surprisingly, the socio-economic status of patients is not found to influence the efficiency score.  
Having a higher percentage of patients who are unemployed does not affect very much the 
efficiency of practices, nor does the income and education of patients.  Multicollinearity across 
the model dummy variables and various patient characteristics may be thwarting our attempt to 
tease out the effect of patient socio-economic variables in the regression analysis.  
Unfortunately, the exclusion of the variables which are correlated with the model dummies does 
not improve the significance level of other patient characteristics in explaining the variation in 
efficiency scores.   
The results reported in table 6 show that the fact that the practice serves patients with 
particular needs does affect efficiency.  The larger the proportion of patients who perceive their 
health as being good, the more efficient the practice site becomes (especially in scenario 1). 
Similarly, the larger the proportion of patients with conditions lasting more than one year, the 
lower the efficiency score (again, in scenario 1). Patients with several chronic conditions appear 
to have a positive impact on efficiency in scenario 1; however this variable is highly negatively 
correlated with the good health variable, so its estimated coefficient may be unstable. 
Eliminating both the long-term conditions and chronic conditions variables from the analysis 
increases the adjusted R-squared for the regression; the impact of “GOOD HEALTH” on 
efficiency persists.  
  Geographic location and other environmental characteristics captured by the rurality 
index have a positive influence on efficiency scores in scenario 1. Practices in rural areas seem 
to be more efficient, ceteris paribus. Once again, the results for the other two scenarios are 
different, likely because HSOs - which rank higher in scenario 2 and 3 - are located mostly in 
one urban area.  The age of the practice site does not seem to have a statistically significant 
impact on efficiency.  The fact that the number of HSO practices was frozen for many years, and    15 
that the FHN model is relatively new, may mean that there is not enough variation in the practice 
year variable to exert a significant effect on efficiency. 
 
Conclusion, limitations, and policy implications 
This paper compares and contrasts four different models of primary care delivery in 
Ontario with a view to identifying, if possible, which model is the most efficient and under what 
circumstances.  It is clear that how output and inputs are measured matters.  One of the 
innovative elements of the data set used in the paper is its focus on both qualitative and 
quantitative indicators of output.  And one of the clear advantages of the DEA procedure is its 
ability to incorporate a variety of inputs and outputs and then weigh them in order to present 
each practice in the best possible light. 
If we look only at the raw data on the qualitative indicators of output, CHC practices 
perform reasonably well.  On average, they achieve scores higher than the other three models for 
three of the eight performance indicators: health promotion, chronic disease management, and 
comprehensiveness and fare relatively well on prevention and access.  The HSO model has the 
highest average for the continuity of care and access to primary care services variables.  FHNs 
are the best in terms of preventive services. 
  However, once costs are added to the mix in the DEA analysis, CHCs are the least 
efficient practice sites virtually across the board, whereas the FFS model performs the best.  The 
efficiency scores of both the HSO and FHN sites are more evenly distributed across all quartiles 
in comparison to FFS and CHCs. The data show that these efficiency score rankings are driven 
by the costs of running the practice.  
A number of reasons explain the poor efficiency scores of the CHCs. The link between 
performance indicators and costs may be non-linear, and it therefore may be relatively    16 
inexpensive to achieve a low level of performance, but very costly to push these indicators 
beyond any given threshold.  Practices with higher-than-average performance on quality of care 
and service delivery indicators may require many more resources than practices providing a 
lower quality of care.  Another reason is related to the limitations of the study which focused on 
clinical primary care; thus the collected expenditure/cost data do not take account of the costs 
associated with shifting health care from primary care providers onto hospitals, emergency 
rooms, specialists and outsourced diagnostic services, as well as the costs of prescribed drugs.  
The costs absorbed by patients, insurance payers, provincial governments and society as a whole 
are likely to be significant.  If the better quality care provided by CHCs were to reduce these 
expenses it could diminish or eliminate the cost differences found between the CHC model and 
the others.  Finally, it may well be that CHCs are funded are too small relative to the large fixed 
costs necessary to operate a multidisciplinary health centre, and hence their average costs are 
very high.  
It is also interesting to ask why fee-for-service practices fare so well in the DEA analysis. 
Part of the story, undoubtedly, is that the broader costs of the FFS approach are borne outside of 
the practices themselves – costs such as the reputed over-use of specialists. Nevertheless, FFS 
physicians clearly face incentives to see as many patients as possible given that their 
remuneration depends upon the number of visits conducted per period of time, while, at the same 
time, they would want to minimize the costs of running their individual practices because 
physicians themselves are the residual claimants to the proceeds of the practice.  
Overall, the efficiency scores of the FHN and HSO models lie somewhere in-between 
FFS and CHC practices.  In terms of quality of care, FHNs and HSOs are on average at least as 
good as the FFSs or better, particular in the area of prevention – not surprisingly since physicians 
in these models receive financial bonuses for reaching certain performance indicators measuring    17 
quality of care.  In terms of the costs of remunerating physicians, however, FHNs and HSOs are 
overall more expensive than FFS practices.  This may be explained by the fact that physicians 
who are paid prospectively on a capitation basis have to be compensated for bearing the financial 
risks associated with running their practices, while CHC physicians who are also paid 
prospectively (on a salary base) do not bear such risk, as they do not own the centres.  
  The findings of this paper show clearly that practice type matters. How practices are 
organized and how physicians are remunerated affect the costs associated with providing patient 
care. However, we cannot say unequivocally that one type of primary care model dominates. In 
particular, further research, which better tracks the relationship between the primary care model 
and the use of other health system resources, is necessary in order to better understand which 
approach makes the best use of public resources.    18   
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Figure 1: Efficient Frontier  
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Table 1: Input and output measures 
 
Variable name  Definition 
I. Output Variables 
1) Intensity of Service Utilization 
Visits/patient Average  number of visits per patient 
2) Technical Quality of Care Indicators 
Prevent  Prevention score [0,1] 
Chronic_Mngt  Chronic disease management score [0,1] 
Health Promo  Health promotion score [0,1] 
3) Service Delivery Indicators 
Access  Access to primary care services score [0,1] 
Contin Continuity  of care score [0,1] 
Compreh  Comprehensiveness of care score [0,1] 
II. Input Variables 
Provider/patient  Provider’s FTEs per 1000 patients 
Cost/provider  Full practice site’s expenditure per 
provider’s FTE 
Cost/patient  Full practice site’s expenditure per patient 
    24   
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
a 
Model CHC  FFS  FHN  HSO 
  Variable  Mean  SD Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD 
Output Variables 
Visits/patient
b  5.2  0.94  5  1.55  4.06  1.23  3.68  0.88 
Prevent 59  16.6  53.8  14  60.5  14.3  48.5  12.6 
Chronic_Mngt 71.7 16.3  57.9  20  59.3  19.3  62.2  16.2 
Health Promo  49.6  10.8  40.6  10.4  42.5  9.7  40.1  12.7 
Access 3.0  0.19  2.94  0.217  3.0  0.28  3.3  0.16 
Contin 3.4  0.21  3.5  0.20  3.5  0.16  3.6  0.16 
Compreh 76.5  13.1  61.9  16.8  61.3  17.4  60.6  15.1 
Input Variables 
Provider/patient  1.23  0.58  0.72  0.37  0.77  0.3  0.67  0.34 
Cost/provider  390789  67893  250962  61496  292584  76073  313110  74680 
Cost/patient  480.6  242.5  172.8  76.5  214.5  73.8  199.4  83.2 
a The statistics are calculated on the practice site’s level and then averaged across models
 
b In efficiency score calculations output measure average visits per patient in one year may create an unfavourable 
bias against sites in which physicians take longer time with a patient during a single visit rather than booking several 
visits.  However, the comparison of efficiency scores with the “visit” variable and without it indicates no significant 
difference in model ranking. 
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Table 3: DEA efficiency scores by input scenario and model 
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Table 4: Explanatory variables for regression analysis 
Variable name  Definition 
I. Organizational Structure 
CHC  CHC dummy (=1 if the practice site is a CHC site, 0 otherwise) 
FHN  FHN dummy (=1 if the practice site is a FHN site, 0 otherwise) 
HSO  HSO dummy (=1 if the practice site is a HSO site, 0 otherwise) 
Practyr  The number of years in operation in this model 
II. Patient Profile (a proportion of patients with a certain characteristic to the total number of patients 
who filled out exit questionnaires) 
1. Age/gender profile 
Age65  Proportion of patients age 65 or over  
Male  Proportion of male patients 
2. Socio-economic status 
Immig2  Proportion of patients-immigrants who have been to Canada for 2 or fewer years
a 
Unempl  Proportion of unemployed, excluding housewives and househusbands and those who study 
LowIncome  Proportion of patients living in a household with the household income lower than $20,000 
per an equivalent household member 
LowEdu  Proportion of patients with education less than high school 
3. Health status of patients 
GoodHealth  Proportion of patients who perceived their health being excellent or very good
b 
Cond  Proportion of patients with physical, mental or emotional condition that have lasted or are 
likely to last longer than one year 
Chronic  The number of chronic conditions per patient (Average per practice) 
III. Environmental variable 
RI  Rurality index. Higher index is associated with relatively remote areas with lower level of 
services available.   
aA threshold of 5 years yields equal significance in the analysis. 
bA variable representing the proportion of patients who perceived their health being fair or poor has not been 
identified as a significant predictor. 
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Table 5: Summary statistics for explanatory variables in regression analysis 
 




Cond Chronic Practyr  RI 
CHC                                  
mean  14.5 26.1  18.7  12.8  0.33  23  41.6  47  1.9  17.5 13.5 
sd  11.9 13.2  22.4  8.2  0.15  10.5  8.5  14.8  0.5  7.3  17.1 
FFS                                  
mean  20.2 34.6  10.4  5  0.15  14  46  42.9  1.75  16.3 13.1 
sd  9.7 17.7 12.1  4.7  0.09  10  9.9  10.8 0.47 10.2 18.5 
FHN                                  
mean  22.8 34.3  3.3  3.6  0.15  14.1  47.6  40.7  1.8  2.34 18.3 
sd  9.9 13  3.7  3.1  0.09  9.5  12.6 6.8 0.45 1.17  20.8 
HSO                                  
mean  24.8 39.8  2.91  3.43  0.15  16.4  50.7  37.7  1.68  15.3  8 
sd  11.1 9.69  4.21  3.33  0.08  8.51  10.1  10  0.35  6.7  9.23 
Total                                  
mean  21.2 34.6  7.89  5.54  0.18  16.3  47  41.6  1.78  12.7 12.9 
sd  11 14.3  13  5.87  0.12  9.98  10.8 10.9 0.45 9.39  16.9 
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Table 6: The influence of patient and practice characteristics on efficiency 
 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Explanatory 
variable  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Constant  0.518 0.000 0.649 0.001 0.547 0.004 
CHC -0.194  0.000  -0.244  0.002  -0.091  0.197 
HSO  -0.120 0.005 -0.090 0.131 -0.017 0.753 
FHN  -0.063 0.197 -0.074 0.291 -0.058 0.366 
Age65  -0.005 0.004 0.006 0.026 0.007 0.002 
Male  0.002 0.118 -0.003 0.062 -0.003 0.038 
Immig2  0.000 0.800 -0.000 0.890 0.001 0.661 
Unempl  0.003 0.388 -0.004 0.425 -0.009 0.086 
LowIncome  -0.011 0.954 0.152 0.584 0.118 0.647 
LowEdu  -0.003 0.158 0.003 0.359 0.004 0.151 
GoodHealth 0.004 0.033 0.001 0.707 -0.000 0.923 
Cond  -0.003 0.137 0.001 0.772 0.001 0.548 
Chronic  0.083 0.119 -0.143 0.059 -0.113 0.105 
RI  0.002 0.013 -0.002 0.253 -0.003 0.023 
Practyr  0.000 0.884 0.001 0.689 -0.000 0.943 
 
Adj. R-
squared 
 
0.2740 
 
0.181 
 
0.193 
 
 
 
 